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Abstract
Are labels cues to category membership or simply highly
salient features? This question is difficult to answer defini-
tively because of the challenge in identifying empirical pre-
dictions that would be distinct in each case: either way, one
would expect labels to be highly interesting, easy to process,
and preferentially used as the basis of generalization. Here we
suggest that one difference should be in how the label directs
(or fails to direct) attention to the other, less-salient features
of the object. We perform a categorization experiment with
complex objects containing many low-salience features, and
find that labels affect attention to the other features in the same
way that highly salient features such as color or sounds do (and
unlike an explicit cue to category membership). This results in
a diminished ability to use the less-salient features of the cate-
gories to generalize appropriately.
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Introduction
Shakespeare once famously asked “What’s in a name?” Over
the past few decades, psychologists have studied the scientific
version of this question: what is the role of labels in category
learning? How do labels affect categorization: the categories
people form, the inductions they license, and the generaliza-
tions they make? What assumptions about labels do people
bring to the tasks of word and category learning? These ques-
tions have been of special interest in the study of language
acquisition, because understanding the assumptions children
bring to the problem of word learning is key to understanding
their linguistic development.
Much evidence demonstrates that children assume that la-
bels are special in some way. Infants familiarized to items
from a novel category will treat it like a category if they hear a
label attached to the items, but not if they hear a non-linguistic
sound (Balaban & Waxman, 1997; Fulkerson & Waxman,
2007) or hear nothing at all (Waxman & Markow, 1995; Wax-
man & Braun, 2005). Moreover, infants use labels but not
sounds for individuation (Xu, 2002) and as a basis for in-
ductive inference (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Davidson &
Gelman, 1990; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004).
Why do labels have this special status? Although in-
fants appear uniquely interested in speech (Vouloumanos &
Werker, 2004), they are equally capable of learning mappings
involving non-linguistic sounds as words (Roberts & Jacob,
1991; Woodward & Hoyne, 1999). This suggests that the
“specialness” of labels is not solely due to increased attention
or interest in speech in general (although it may be related
to the fact that the input is auditory; see Robinson & Slout-
sky, 2004, 2006). Furthermore, when labels are inconsis-
tent with apparent category structure or similarity, infants and
children are much more reluctant to form categories based
on them (Davidson & Gelman, 1990; Waxman & Braun,
2005; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 2008); this may suggest that
words are important because they tend to pick out useful cate-
gories. Perhaps children make the assumption that labels map
cleanly onto category structure because labels are referential:
younger infants will categorize using symbolic forms other
than words (e.g., gestures or pictograms) if they are used in a
referential context (Namy, 2001; Campbell & Namy, 2003),
and older infants will use labels to pick out global categories
only if they are presented in person by an experimenter rather
than a recording(Fulkerson & Haaf, 2003). Another possibil-
ity is that infants assume that words identify useful categories
because they statistically tend to do so (Samuelson & Smith,
1999), and infants’ statistical learning mechanisms are well-
attuned for picking this sort of pattern up (Smith, Jones, &
Landau, 1996).
As this discussion illustrates, there is some disagreement
about how and why labels are special. It may be that labels are
special because they are linguistic – referential and used for
communication – and infants realize this (Balaban & Wax-
man, 1997; Namy, 2001; Xu, 2002; Fulkerson & Waxman,
2007). Alternatively, it may be that infants have learned to
pay special attention to words because they are statistically
likely to be useful indicators of category structure (Smith et
al., 1996). The special status of labels may also be percep-
tual in origin: perhaps labels play a unique role in category
formation because of their auditory properties (Robinson &
Sloutsky, 2004, 2006, 2007).
This debate parallels a similar, but not identical, discus-
sion in the adult literature – one focused on whether labels
act as category indicators or just a highly salient feature. On
one hand, labels certainly do appear to hold a privileged psy-
chological status in some ways. When objects share a label,
this is sufficient to increase their similarity (e.g., Goldstone,
Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001), and people often make inductive
inferences based on an object’s label rather than its features
or overall similarity(e.g., Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Jo-
hansen & Kruschke, 2005). On the other hand, formal mod-
els of categorization have often been remarkably successful at
matching human performance simply by treating labels as an-
other – possibly highly salient – feature of the stimulus (e.g.,
Anderson, 1991; Gliozzi, Mayor, Hu, & Plunkett, 2009).
One of the difficulties inherent in resolving this debate is
that it is hard to identify characteristics that an indicator of
category membership would have but a very salient feature
would not. For instance, one might suggest that the differ-
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ence might be that if something is an indicator of category
membership, it should be used to pick out categories even
when it seems to be inconsistent with the observed similar-
ity or category structure. There is evidence that this is the
case for labels when they are mildly inconsistent (Yamauchi
& Markman, 2000), but not when they grow too inconsis-
tent (Davidson & Gelman, 1990; Waxman & Braun, 2005).
But does this mean that words are strong markers of cate-
gory membership or salient object features? The problem is
that the results make sense under either theory. On one hand,
if labels are especially salient features then one would ex-
pect them to be followed even if other (less salient) features
seemed to pick out a different category structure; on the other
hand, if labels are treated as markers to category membership
without being features themselves, they could still be such
strong markers that they are nearly impossible to override.
More generally, both highly salient features and cues to
category membership should share many other characteris-
tics: easy to represent, quick to process, and preferentially
used as a basis for generalization. What, then, is the differ-
ence between them? To address this question, it helps to con-
sider the two possibilities individually.
• What are the cognitive effects of a salient feature? Much
work suggests that salient features share two important
characteristics. One is that they tend to be the features
that people examine first when making choices (e.g., Tver-
sky, 1972; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The other is
that if the feature is predictive and useful, it will become
even more salient over the course of learning (Kruschke,
1992, 2003). As a consequence, if a feature is initially
quite salient and later turns out to be predictive of cate-
gory membership, even more attention will be devoted to
it, and the attention devoted to the other features will de-
crease commensurately, particularly if they themselves are
not salient or are difficult to process.
• What are the cognitive effects of a cue to category mem-
bership? Less research bears directly on this question, but
we can begin by considering the case of something that
is unequivocally a cue to category membership and also
unequivocally not a feature: explicit instruction. Imagine
telling someone that objects from category A were sorted
into one box and objects from category B were sorted into
another. Those boxes (along with the instructions) would
be cues to category membership, but not features of the
objects. How would this affect processing of the objects?
Not surprisingly, providing this kind of structure in the vi-
sual presentation of stimuli tends to improve learning by
calling attention to the relevant features and minimizing
the processing load imposed on the learner (e.g., Bruner,
Goodnow, & Austin, 1956, ch. 4). As a result the effect on
attention is expected to be in the opposite direction: those
object features that are less salient, will be processed much
more than they otherwise might.
Do the cognitive effects of labelling look more like those
of features, or of cues to category membership? We address
this question by presenting participants with a simple cate-
gorization task involving objects with numerous non-salient
and difficult-to-process features paired with a category indi-
cator of some sort. In one condition, the category indicator is
intended to be a strong cue to category membership: the ob-
jects are explicitly categorized by being sorted into boxes. In
two other conditions, the category indicator is a highly salient
non-linguistic feature (a color or a non-linguistic sound). In
two final conditions, the category indicator is a label (either
written or oral). After sorting the objects, participants are
asked how they would classify new objects for which the cat-
egory indicator is unknown. Importantly, because the cate-
gory indicator is unknown and the other features so complex
and low-salience, performance on the generalization task re-
flects how much people have attended to those features. If the
category indicator acts like a cue to category membership by
calling attention to the less-salient features, generalization on
the basis of them should be improved when given the indica-
tor; however, if the category indicator acts more like a salient
feature by directing attention away from the less-salient fea-
tures, generalization should be poor. Our results suggest that
labels behave much like other extremely salient features in
the way that they focus attention away from other features of
an object.
Method
92 adult participants were recruited from the University of
Adelaide and surrounding community and were paid $5 for
their participation in the half-hour experiment. Two partic-
ipants were excluded due to failure to understand the task,
leaving 18 people in each of five possible conditions. Each
participant saw a series of trials in which they were asked
to sort novel objects into categories. They were then asked
two generalization questions about how they would catego-
rize additional objects without category indicators. Each of
the objects has eight features, four of which vary coherently
according to the category structure, and four of which are ran-
dom. In half of the trials (the NO INDICATOR trials), partic-
ipants were asked to sort these objects into clusters. In the
other half (the INDICATOR trials) the task was the same ex-
cept that the objects were also each associated with a category
indicator, the nature of which varied by condition.
Items. Each item consists of a square with four symbolic
characters (one in each quadrant) surrounded by circles (also
containing symbolic characters) at each corner; we refer to
each location as one of the eight low-salience features of the
objects, and the particular character in that location as its fea-
ture value. Each feature can take on a value corresponding to
one of ten specific characters, and there is no overlap of pos-
sible character sets (feature values) from feature to feature.
For each participant and trial, features were generated inde-
pendently, according to the following pattern: four features
are randomly selected to be dispersed, meaning that they do
not respect category structure because they are uniformly se-
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Figure 1: Example INDICATOR trial in the BOXES condition (for vi-
sual clarity, we show 6 objects rather than 8 or 16). In this condition,
objects are presented already sorted into boxes corresponding to two
categories. Here the four coherent features are the two upper circles,
the upper right square, and the lower right circle. These features
have a 75% coherence level: each of the four coherent features has
25% probability of being “flipped” from the value appropriate to its
category.
lected from the possible set of values for that feature. The
other four are coherent, meaning that they correspond to the
underlying category structure: feature A corresponds to cate-
gory structure if all members of category X share a the same
feature value for A (say, all of them have a δ in the upper
left corner of the square). We systematically varied the co-
herence1 level of the four coherent features so that half of
the trials involved items with a coherence level of 75%, and
half involved a coherence of 100%. This mimics real-world
categories, which have a probabilistic, graded structure.2 It
is possible to identify the correct categories on the basis of
the coherent features, as people have succeeded in doing in
other studies (Perfors & Tenenbaum, 2009). However, be-
cause these features are numerous, of low salience, and rep-
resentationally complex, it can be difficult.
Sample objects as they appeared in the experiment are
shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Trial structure. Each participant saw eight NO INDICA-
TOR and eight INDICATOR trials. In order to ensure that par-
ticipants were not relying on external knowledge about how
many categories the correct sorting contained, trials varied in
the number of items (8 or 16) and the number of categories
(2 or 4). Since items varied also in coherence, this resulted in
the following factorial design: 2 (INDICATOR or NO INDICA-
TOR) x 2 (coherence level of 75% or 100%) x 2 (containing
8 or 16 items total) x 2 (categories made of 2 or 4 items).
This resulted in 16 trials per participant. Due to a coding
error, trials with 8 items and 2 categories were not properly
counterbalanced according to category indicator, so all anal-
yses excluded these trials and therefore consisted of 12 trials
per participant. Figure 1 shows the sort of situation a partic-
1A coherence of c means that a feature value has a (100− c)%
chance of being randomly generated rather than following category
structure.
2There were no interaction effects between coherence and any of
the results of interest here, so all analyses combine coherence levels.
Figure 2: Example NO INDICATOR trial, which participants in all
conditions were exposed to. In this sort of trial, people are told
to sort the objects in whatever way appears sensible, and are not
told in advance how many categories there are or what features are
important or useful. In this trial the coherence level is 100%: each of
the four coherent features (which are the same as in Figure 1) follow
the category structure precisely.
ipant might see on an INDICATOR trial in the BOXES condi-
tion, while Figure 2 shows a typical NO INDICATOR trial.
Conditions. The five conditions are defined by the nature
of the category indicator involved in the INDICATOR trials.
In the BOXES condition, participants saw the objects already
pre-sorted into boxes; this is intended as an explicit cue to
category membership, and was described to participants as
such. In two of the other conditions, the objects in the INDI-
CATOR trials were associated with a label. In the WRITTEN
LABEL condition, participants were told that the label would
be written above the object. To evaluate whether it mattered
if the label was presented visually or orally, in the ORAL LA-
BEL condition, the label was presented out loud (over head-
phones) whenever the participant clicked on the object. Since
participants had to click on all objects in order to sort them,
they ended up hearing the labels for every object at some
point. The label conditions were compared to two conditions
in which the category indicator was simply a highly salient
feature. In the COLOR condition, objects were colored (unlike
the objects in the NO INDICATOR trials and other conditions,
which were always white). And in the SOUND condition,
objects were associated with non-linguistic sounds (distinct
buzzes, beeps, and tone sequences without semantic associa-
tions). As in the ORAL LABEL condition, these sounds were
heard through headphones whenever the participant clicked
on the object.
Procedure. Each trial consisted of two phases. The first
was the “sorting” phase, in which participants were presented
with all of the objects in the trial randomly scattered on the
computer screen and asked to sort them in categories. (The
exception is the INDICATOR trials in the BOXES condition,
in which the objects appeared already sorted with square
“boxes” drawn around each of the categories, as depicted in
Figure 1). During the sorting phase, participants were al-
lowed unlimited time in which to move the objects around
on the screen by clicking and dragging them into clusters.
They then drew boxes around the objects to indicate cate-
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Figure 3: Performance in the sorting task. Subjects in the ORAL
LABEL, WRITTEN LABEL, and SOUND conditions used the category
indicators to sort at close to optimal levels. When there was no cat-
egory indicator, people were able to use the less-salient features to
sort, but were significantly worse than when there was one.
gories. People were told ahead of time that not all trials would
have the same number of items or categories, and they should
just sort in whatever way seemed sensible.
After the sorting task was completed, the items remained
on the screen and participants were presented with two gener-
alization questions in random order. In first-order generaliza-
tion, participants were shown one of the items they had sorted
(without category indicator) and asked which of two novel
items would go in the same category as that one. The correct
answer had the four coherent features in common with the
first, and the incorrect answer had the four other features in
common. The second-order generalization trials were iden-
tical, except that the item shown to the participants had spe-
cific feature values that had not been seen before: a person
could only answer correctly if they realized that the coherent
features (rather than specific values) were what mattered for
category organization. As in Perfors and Tenenbaum (2009),
our participants performed identically in the first- and second-
order generalization, so all analyses collapse them together
into one variable, gen.
Results
There are two natural questions to ask. First, does the na-
ture of the category indicator affect people’s sorting behav-
ior? Second, does it affect how people pay attention to the
other, less-salient features of the objects? We can address the
second question by examining generalization performance in
each condition, since our generalization tasks do not include
the category indicator and therefore necessarily rely on the
other features. The answer to the first is important for know-
ing how to interpret the answer to the second: for instance, if
generalization performance is poorer because people cannot
figure out the correct categories, that does not tell us anything
about how people are attending to the less-salient features
given those categories. We therefore begin with addressing
how sorting performance depends on the nature of the cate-
gory indicator.
Sorting performance
Sorting performance is evaluated using a standard measure
for evaluating the similarity between two clusterings of items
known as the adjusted Rand Index (adjR) of Hubert and Ara-
bie (1985). In this case, we use adjR to measure the similarity
between the correct category clustering and the category as-
signments made by the participants. An adjR of 1 indicates
that the clusters are identical, while 0 is the score one would
expect from two random clusterings; scores below 0 indicate
that the clusters match less than one would expect by chance.
Figure 3 indicates that category indicator has a strong effect
on sorting performance.3 Participants in the ORAL LABEL,
WRITTEN LABEL, and SOUND conditions sorted nearly opti-
mally, which suggests that they used the category indicators
to create their categories (since sorting according to category
indicator is optimal sorting). Participants on the NO INDICA-
TOR trials were able to use the less-salient features to sort at
an above-chance level, but performed worse than when given
a category indicator. Finally, people in the COLOR condition
sorted halfway in-between, suggesting that color was a more
salient feature than the symbolic characters, but not as salient
as labels or sounds.
Generalization
Based on sorting performance it appears that participants gen-
erally created sensible categories. Were they able to form
generalizations about category membership based on the less-
salient features? We test this, as explained earlier, by present-
ing participants with additional items and asking how they
would categorize a novel item they had not seen before. Fig-
ure 4 demonstrates that generalization in the BOXES condition
was generally superior to generalization in the other condi-
tions, all of which were similar to each other.4 Since general-
ization depends on what the participant notices about the less-
salient features other than the category indicator, this suggests
that in the BOXES condition people were paying more atten-
tion to those features than in any of the other conditions.
These two results, taken together, drive the main conclu-
sion of this paper: labels appear to act more like highly salient
features than overt category indicators (boxes). Labels, like
highly salient features, support accurate sorting, but are asso-
ciated with poorer levels of generalization to new items. We
have suggested that the reason for this may be because the
labels and salient features are directing attention away from
the non-salient features during the sorting task; this impairs
generalization because attention to the non-salient features is
3A one-way Anova on adjR by condition was significant:
F(4,158) = 9.77, p = 4.34e−7. Post-hoc comparisons using the
Tukey-Kramer test indicated that the mean adjR in the NO INDI-
CATOR condition was significantly different than mean adjR in the
ORAL LABEL, WRITTEN LABEL, and SOUND conditions.
4A one-way Anova on generalization by condition was signifi-
cant: F(5,176) = 2.91, p = 0.0149. Post-hoc comparisons using the
Tukey-Kramer test indicated that the generalization in the BOXES
condition was significantly different from the NO INDICATOR and
ORAL LABEL conditions, and nearly significantly different from the
other three.
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Figure 4: Generalization on the basis of the non-salient features in
the BOXES condition was superior to generalization in the other con-
ditions, suggesting that participants in the other conditions did not
attend as much to the less-salient features when generalizing.
necessary for accurate generalization of novel items (which
are not associated with a label or highly salient feature). This
would explain why generalization in those conditions is lower
than generalization in the BOXES condition.
However, one minor yet confusing aspect of these results
remains: if the salient features are truly directing attention
away from the non-salient features, why is generalization per-
formance not poorer on the INDICATOR trials than the NO IN-
DICATOR trials, at least in all conditions other than BOXES?
After all, it might be assumed that people are less able to
use the non-salient features when they have the distracting,
highly-salient features around, especially since those features
do a very good job at picking out the category members.
Relating sorting and generalization
We address this question by realizing that two factors drive
generalization performance, which depends ultimately on
knowing which of the less-salient features pick out which cat-
egories. It therefore requires not only being able to attend to
and identify the less-salient features, but also knowing what
the correct categories are. On the INDICATOR trials in the
WRITTEN LABEL, ORAL LABEL, SOUND, and COLOR condi-
tions, participants may be less able to attend to the non-salient
features, but be better at identifying the categories in the first
place. These factors may therefore be cancelling each other
out, resulting in generalization that is very similar to the NO
INDICATOR conditions.
This possibility yields a testable prediction, namely that in
the NO INDICATOR trials sorting performance should be pos-
itively correlated with generalization, but in the INDICATOR
trials it should be more irrelevant.5 We would not expect it
to be entirely irrelevant since, after all, one must be able to
identify the categories in order to generalize correctly. How-
ever, the converse is not necessarily true: identifying the cat-
egories in the INDICATOR conditions would not imply that
5Note that when we refer to sorting in the INDICATOR trials, we
are excluding the BOXES condition, since participants do not actu-
ally have to sort anything – the items are already placed into boxes.
All of these analysis, therefore, excluded the BOXES condition from
the INDICATOR trials.
one should be able to generalize correctly, since generaliza-
tion requires attention to the less-salient features but catego-
rization does not. We test this by calculating the correlation
between sorting accuracy (adjR) and generalization (gen) for
both the INDICATOR and NO INDICATOR trials. Although
both are significant, the size of the effect on the INDICATOR
trials is markedly weaker.6 While not conclusive, this is con-
sistent with our interpretation of the results: sorting is less
predictive of generalization in the INDICATOR trials because
sorting does not depend on the less-salient features in those
trials, unlike in the NO INDICATOR situation.
Discussion
This research is motivated by the question of whether labels
are cues to category membership or simply highly salient fea-
tures. The question is difficult to answer in part because it is
hard to predict what would be empirically different in each
case: no matter what, one would expect labels to be highly
interesting, easy to process, and preferentially used as the ba-
sis of generalization (but also to be ignorable if they were
inconsistent with category structure). We suggest that one
difference between cues to category membership and highly
salient features is their effect on the processing of the other,
less salient features of the objects: highly salient features
should direct attention away from the less salient ones, while
cues to category membership should direct attention toward
them. We tested this by presenting participants with a sorting
task involving objects with many complex, low-salience fea-
tures, and then posing generalization questions that required
attention to the less-salient features to answer correctly. Our
main results, shown in Figures 3 and 4, suggest that labels act
more like highly salient features than they act like boxes (an
explicit external cue to category membership).
One might object that this result is not very surprising. Af-
ter all, stimuli in the BOXES condition may be easier to pro-
cess since they have one fewer feature – the cue to category
membership is the box and the visual organization of the ob-
jects, not any features inherent to them. However, in a very
real sense this is precisely our point: if something is acting as
a cue to category membership, it should improve performance
by reducing the load required to process the actual features of
the objects. Labels, whether oral or written, did not do that in
our study.
An important subtlety lies in how we define salience. In
what way are the labels in our study really “highly salient”?
All of them except for the written label are perceptually no-
ticeable; is this what we mean? The written label was actually
fairly small relative to the size of the entire object, so why
do people treat it as highly salient? In answer, we note the
importance of distinguishing perceptual salience from what
we might call conceptual salience. A feature is perceptually
salient because our basic perceptual mechanisms automati-
cally notice and process it preferentially or more easily; this
6Spearman’s: INDICATOR: ρ = 0.192, p = 0.007; NO INDICA-
TOR: ρ= 0.499, p < 0.0001.
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might be true of speech input (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004)
or auditory input in early childhood (Robinson & Sloutsky,
2004). By contrast, a feature may be conceptually salient if
we have learned to attend to it preferentially for more abstract
conceptual reasons – perhaps because it has proven useful in
the past, or if it is easier to process because we have practiced
processing it for many years. If the written labels are highly
salient, this is probably the sense in which they are. The
distinction between the two types of salience gets somewhat
blurry at the edges, since many features may be both percep-
tually and cognitively salient, or change in salience over time.
The important point, however, is that for our purposes some-
thing is salient if it invites preferential attention or is easier
to process; that may be because of perceptual factors, learned
conceptual factors, or some mixture of both, and we do not
address that question in this work.
One limitation of our study is the fact that it was pre-
sented entirely on a computer using bizarre objects with many
representationally complex features. The complexity of the
features was intentional since we wanted to maximize our
chances of creating a situation in which low attention to the
features had a measurable effect on generalization; however,
it is possible that, due to the unnaturalness of the situation,
people adopted a strategy unlike that which they use in the
real world. It is also possible that labels, since they are nor-
mally referential and communicative, might have a differ-
ent effect when presented in a communicative, social context
rather than on a computer. There is evidence that for children,
labelling by a person results in different behavior to labelling
by a recorder (Fulkerson & Haaf, 2003), and that non-labels
can behave more like labels when presented in a referential
context (Campbell & Namy, 2003). However, it is unclear
how (or if) these findings will generalize to children, to more
naturalistic stimuli, or to different contexts; future work is
necessary.
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